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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

Synopsis of Some of the Leading Cases Recently Decided
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals
Harvey v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.
This case was appealed from the Muhlenberg Circuit Court and
opinion handed down by the Kentucky Court of Appeals on June
i6th, 1914.
This action was instituted by Harvey to recover damages for
personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the negligence of
the railroad company, and the jury returned the verdict for the
company.
It appears that at a station called Nelson on its line of road there
are three tracks running north and south, all of them being crossed
at right angles by a public road running east and west. The center
track is the main track, the one on the east a switch and the one on
the west a passing track. On the afternoon of the day the plaintiff
was injured, one of the defendant's freight trains put in on the passing
track for the purpose of letting a north bound passenger train pass
on the main track. This freight was cut in two at a road crossing
for the purpose of leaving the public road open for travel. Just
after the road crossing had been cleared, the plaintiff in company
with his wife attempted to go across these tracks on the public road
in a buggy from the east to the west side when the horse he was
driving, which the evidence showed to have been an ordinary gentle
horse, became frightened and stopped on the tracks.
The question in this case depended upon the testimony that was
introduced here as to whether or not the defendant company was
liable but the court laid down the rules which govern such cases which
hereafter follow:
"Based upon the Kentucky Statutes, Section 768, Sub-section
5, it provides that a railroad company shall not obstruct any public highway for more than five minutes at a time. If a train
which has blockaded a crossing for five minutes is not ready to
move, the crossing must be cleared by cutting the train in two
or by some other method."
Under this law the court holds that where the railroad crosses a
highway the railroad company and the public must exercise the right
to use the crossing in such a manner as to subject the other to as
little inconvenience and trouble as is practicable under these circumstances, and under ordinary circumstances the railroad company's
train have the right of way over other vehicles at the highway
crossings.
Where the railway company crosses a public highway the railway
company has no more authority than other persons to place obstruc-
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tions likely to frighten horses upon or near the. public road unless
necessary in the use of repairs or construction on the road.
Under the above section of the statutes the railroad company is
under the duty of clearing the highway crossing and it must do so in
such a manner that the entire right of way shall be open for travel,
and it is not sufficient to merely open a space between the cars of
the train over a part of the road for travel or open a space wide enough
to permit vehicles to pass.
When a freight train standing at a highway crossing was cut to
leave the road open to travel in such a manner as to obstruct a part of
the highway, it was not negligence for the driver of a horse, which
was gentle and accustomed to trains, to attempt to cross though the
horse became frightened at the cars.
Laying down the above principles of law as applicable to this
case at a point on the roalroad crossing where there were three tracks,
a freight train on the third track had been cut in two to leave the
highway open to travel but in such a manner as to partly obstruct the
highway. The horse on the second or main track became frightened
and refused to go on. The passenger train was approaching on that
track and the plaintiff jumped out and succeeded in pulling the horse
about half way across the third track when it backed sufficiently that
the train struck the buggy, jerking the horse down and causing the
plaintiff -to fall and injure himself. Under such circumstances the
court holds that the plaintiff had a right, acting as a reasonable,
prudent man under the circumstances, and would try to make an
effort to protect his property, and it is a question for the jury to say
whether a reasonable, prudent man would have attempted to hold the
horse to prevent it from backing on the main track instead of remaining as he might in a place of safety. The court below has refused to
submit this question to the jury and the Court of Appeals reversed
the case and sent it back for a new trial.
Miller Creek Railroad Co., v. Blevins.
This was a damage suit appealed from the. Johnson Circuit Court
decided June 19 th, 1914, growing out of the following facts:
The company's line of railway extends from Van Lear down
Miller's Creek to its main line and thence across Big Sandy river to
Van Lear Junction. A short distance from the bridge spanning the
river the railroad crosses the county road. About 1200 feet from
the county road there is a steep bluff around which the railroad makes
a sharp curve. From the curve to the crossing the county road and
railroad are practically parallel. The distance from the county road
to the railroad is estimated at from ten to forty feet. At a point
about 827 feet from the railroad crossing is a whistling post. Between
the whistling post and the crossing is a telephone post about 453 feet
from the crossing and 374 feet from the whistling post. From 'the
whistling post to the bluff is about 158 yards.
On the occasion of the accident which occurred, the plaintiff in
company with her husband and two children was travelling along the
county road in question. After crossing the railroad and when they
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had reached a point a few feet from the crossing, the company's train
came around the curve a few hundred yards distant. The mare which
the plaintiff was riding became frightened and her husband attempted
to restrain her but the mare broke loose. When the train got near her,
the whistle was sounded and the mare went up the side of the hill
and threw the plaintiff off. The accident occurred near the telephone
post, which stands between the railroad crossing and the whistling
post. While those on the engine denied that they saw the plaintiff,
one of the plaintiff's sons testified that the fireman, when the engine
was about 40o feet away from the plaintiff, was looking right at her,
and, when the whistle was subsequently sounded and the mare threw
the plaintiff, the fireman was looking out at the window and laughing.
The court laid down this as the rule governing such cases:
"When the railroad company's employees saw the danger of
traveler or on the adjoining highway from the horse becoming
frightened at the blowing of the whistle, it was their duty if
necessary in the exercise of ordinary care to cease blowing the
whistle as a crossing signal and resort to the bell; their duty to
give the statutory signal not absolving them from such duty, as
the statutes provided either mode of giving the warning."
Hamilton etc., v. Savings Bank & Co.
This case was appealed from the Montgomery Circuit Court and
the opinion rendered on June I 9 th, 1914.
In the autumn of I9O9, Appellant was in default in the payment
of a past due $4.ooo bond and a past due $6.5oo bond with six months'
interest on the first named debt and one year's interest on the second
debt, making a total in arrears of $io,5oo. Early in January 191o the
appellant took a loan from the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance
Company for $15,OOO, a sum sufficient to pay all the back debt and
interest. The Northwestern loan was secured by mortgage on the
plaintiff's lands, being the same lands upon which the original debt
was secured to appellee. The loan from the insurance company was
on a 5% basis and was obtained for the purpose of paying the back
debt which was drawing 6%; but a prerequisite to the Northwestern
loan was a cancellation and release of the back debt and mortgage.
The bank and the Northwestern each sent a representative to Mt.
Sterling, one to turn over the money on the due loan and the other
to receive it, and certified or recorded the mortgage. At the same
time appellant paid to the bank representative $1,5oo in addition to
the debt and interest. This payment it will be noticed will be equivalent to I7 on the principal debt of the bank. This suit was brought
by the appellant against the bank to recover that sum of $1,5oo, and
this right to recover is the only question involved in this suit. It
appears that the debt due the bank was made at a rate of 6% and
had several years yet to run, and, as a concession to appellants, they
were allowed to pay off the debt before maturity by paying the I%
as above stated. Under the law of Kentucky was this payment
usurious? If so, the Appellant had the right to recover.
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The court holds that the payment was not usurious and was also
not made by duress that the payment of the 1% was a consideration
for the privilege of paying off the money before maturity and was
therefore collectable.
Worrell Mfg. Co., v. City of Ashland.
This case was appealed from Boyd Circuit Court, the opinion
handed down June 19 th, 1914, and the facts in the case are as follows:
R. A. Shepheard was the City Clerk of Ashland. On November
2nd. 19o9, he purchased from the Worrell Mfg. Company, for the use
of the city 6o gallons of insect exterminator at 2 cents a gallon, and
also 4oo pounds of Cotto-Waxo Sweeping compound at 3 cents a
pound; the whole order aggregating $132.00. On November 19 th,
19o9, eleven days later, Shepheard purchased an additional 6o gallons
of the insect exterminator at 2 cents per gallon . The goods were
shipped to the city in Shepheard's care. Shepheard agreed to see that
the bills for the same were allowed by the Board of Council on or
before April Ist. 191o. Before that time he was removed from office.

The Board of Council declined to pay for the goods. Thereupon the
Worrell Mfg. Company brought this action against the city to recover
the contract price.
The court in this case holds that the city was not liable on an
implied contract for the value of the insect exterminator purchased
for it by the City Clerk, who acted without express authority, even
if it was accepted and used by the city, where the General Council
alone has the power to bind the City, and properly rejected the bill.
Held that it is better to require those furnishing supplys to or rendering one for a city to see that these contracts are made by authoritative
persons than to permit unauthorized agents to place unlimited liability
on the City.
Gossett v. Commonwealth.
This case was appealed from the Pulaski Circuit Court and decided
by the Court of Appeals on September 24th, 1914, and raised the
question as to the liability of the Appellant to a fine and imprisonment, either or both, under the charge of having in his possession
for sale liquors in local option territory.
Proof in this case showed that the Appellant was a distiller and
had manufactured and had in his possession 50 barrels of whiskey
of his own manufacure. While the evidence did not show any attempt
to sell the liquors, the proof was of such a character as to justify the
lower court in fining him and the higher court in affirming the judgment of the lower court.
The Statute under which he was tried is Sub-section 2, Section
2557b of the Kentucky Statutes.
The Defendant denied the charge of having in his possession
spiritous, vinous or malt liquors for the purpose of selling them, but
it was shown that he had in his possession a license from the United
States Government which would authorize him, as far as the government of the United States was concerned, to sell whiskey. Under
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the laws of Kentucky, the fact that he had such a license is prima
facia evidence of guilt and the burden was shifted upon him to show
that he had no purpose of selling.
The court holds that the jury in the lower court was justified in
finding that Appellant had the whiskey in his possession for the
purpose of selling it in local option territory based upon the fact that
he had a license from the United States Government, and the judgment
of the lower court was therefore affirmed.

THE HUMOROUS SIDE.
Blissful Ignorance.-A man went to a judge and asked whether
he could bring suit for slander against a man who had called him a
rhinoceros.
"Why, certainly," said the judge. "When did he call you that?"
"About three years ago."
"Three years ago; and you only start suit today."
"But, your Honor, yesterday I saw a rhinoceros for the first
time in my life."--Newark News.
Nothing Doing.-Little Margie, on her first visit to a farm, was
told to wander about the barn and search for eggs. Some time later
the child returned almost in tears. "Couldn't you find any eggs,
dearie?" asked the mother.
"No," replied Margie, wearily. "I think its mean, too, 'cause
lots of hens were standing 'round doing nothing."-Case and Comment.
No Escape.--"Two attorneys," says an old newspaper, "in partnership in a town of the United States, had the firm name of "Catchum
& Cheatum," inscribed in the usual manner upon the office door; but
as the singularity and juxtaposition of the words led to many a coarse
joke from passers-by, the men of law attempted to destroy in part
made the affair ten times worse-the inscription ran: "I. Catchum &
U. Cheatum."-Harper's Monthly.
Had Enough.-After a recent railway collision in the Midlands
a Scotchman was extricated from the wreckage by a companion who
had escaped unhurt.
"Never mind, Sandy," his rescurer remarked; "it's nothing serious,
and you'll get damages for it."
"Damages," roared Sandy. "Have I not had enough o'them?
It's repairs I'm seeking the now."
PARTNERSHIP ENDED
A West Virginia darkey, a blacksmith, recently announced a change
in his business as follows:
NOTICE .- De copartnership heretofore resisting between me and
Mose Skinner is hereby resolved. Dem what owe de firm will settld wid
me, and dem what de firm owes will settle wid Mose."

